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ABSTRACT
Objectives: In a cluster randomised controlled trial,
offering financial incentives improved adherence to
antipsychotic depot medication over a 1-year period.
Yet, it is unknown whether this positive effect is
sustained once the incentives stop.
Methods and analyses: Patients in the intervention
and control group were followed up for 2 years after
the intervention. Primary and secondary outcomes
were assessed at 6 months and 24 months post
intervention. Assessments were conducted between
September 2011 and November 2014.
Results: After the intervention period, intervention and
control groups did not show any statistically significant
differences in adherence, neither in the first 6 months
(71% and 77%, respectively) nor in the following
18 months (68%, 74%). There were no statistically
significant differences in secondary outcomes, that is,
adherence ≥95% and untoward incidents either.
Conclusions: It may be concluded that incentives to
improve adherence to antipsychotic maintenance
medication are effective only for as long as they are
provided. Once they are stopped, adherence returns to
approximately baseline level with no sustained benefit.
Trial registration number: ISRCTN77769281;
Results.
Poor adherence to antipsychotic mainten-
ance medication is common in patients with
psychotic disorders1 and linked to a number
of negative outcomes.2 A range of interven-
tions have been tested to improve adherence
to antipsychotic medication, but hardly any
has been shown to be effective. For example,
so-called Compliance Therapy has explicitly
not been recommended by the National
Institute of Clinical Excellence. Thus,
improving adherence in this patient group
remains a challenge in treatment.
Against this background, clinicians in East
London tried ﬁnancial incentives to inﬂu-
ence patients’ adherence to long-acting
injectable antipsychotics (LAIs). They
reported positive outcomes in a small
number of patients.3 A subsequent focus
group study explored the concerns of differ-
ent stakeholders about the idea of providing
ﬁnancial incentives to increase adherence to
antipsychotic medication. While different
concerns were raised, there was wide agree-
ment that it would be important to go
beyond anecdotal evidence and establish the
effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives in a rigor-
ous trial.4 This led to the design and funding
of a cluster randomised controlled trial.5
The trial included patients with psychotic
disorders treated in secondary mental health
teams in the community in England and com-
pared ﬁnancial incentives with treatment as
usual. The ﬁndings demonstrated that offer-
ing ﬁnancial incentives of £15 (US$22, €17)
per LAI over a 1-year period signiﬁcantly
improves adherence to LAIs.6 7 Adherence
already improved within the ﬁrst 3 months of
introducing incentives, and a signiﬁcant dif-
ference with better adherence in patients
being offered incentives was sustained over
the full 1-year intervention period.8 Yet, the
question arises as to whether patients main-
tain improved adherence once incentives
have stopped. Would incentives have a lasting
positive effect on patients’ attitudes and
behaviour resulting in ongoing improved
adherence levels, or would the incentivised
behaviour deteriorate again once the incen-
tives are discontinued? Studies in some
health-related behaviours such as smoking
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Patients have been followed up for 24 months
post intervention to examine shorter-term and
longer-term effects.
▪ Data were not complete and likely not to be
missing at random.
▪ A number of sensitivity analyses support the
main results.
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cessation,9 drug abuse10 or engagement and retention in
HIV treatment and prevention11 12 suggest that positive
changes in response to ﬁnancial incentives return to
baseline, once the incentives have been removed. Other
reports indicate that in the long term, incentivised beha-
viours may even fall below baseline levels,13 14 therefore
having a corruptive effect in the long run.
The aim of this study was to assess long-term outcomes of
offering ﬁnancial incentives to improve adherence to LAIs
over 2 years after the incentives had been discontinued.
METHODS
The FIAT (Financial Incentives for Adherence to
Treatment) trial5 was a cluster randomised trial with a 1:1
allocation ratio of mental health teams to the interven-
tion or control condition. It included 141 patients with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or
bipolar disorder, whose adherence to LAIs—calculated as
the percentage of LAIs received out of those prescribed
over a given period of time—in the 4-month screening
period was ≤75%, were recruited from 73 community
teams across England and Wales. Written informed
consent was obtained from both patients and consultant
psychiatrists/team managers. Teams were randomised to
either the intervention group in which patients received
£15 for each LAI, or the control group which were not
offered any incentives. Apart from offering incentives in
the intervention group, both groups continued with treat-
ment as usual. The intervention lasted for 12 months. All
patients were treated in the National Health Service in
England where all treatments, including LAIs, were free
of charge for all patients all the time.
Recruitment and randomisation procedures, the
sample characteristics and the main ﬁndings are
reported in detail elsewhere.5 6 In brief, the baseline
mean adherence of 69% (SD=16%) and 67% (SD=16%)
in the intervention and control group, respectively,
improved over the 12-month intervention period to 85%
(SD=15%) and 71% (SD=22%). The difference between
the two groups was statistically signiﬁcant (adjusted dif-
ference in means (β)=11.5%, 95% CI (3.9% to 19.0%),
p=0.0003). Patients in the intervention group also had a
signiﬁcantly better subjective quality of life at the end of
the 1-year period.
Patients were followed up after the end of the interven-
tion for another 24 months. Outcomes were assessed
based on medical records for two separate intervals, that
is, the ﬁrst 6 months and the subsequent 18 months, to dis-
tinguish between shorter-term and longer-term outcomes.
The assessments for the ﬁrst 6 months after the end of the
intervention were conducted between September 2011
and May 2013, and assessments for the subsequent
18 months between March 2013 and November 2014.
Primary and secondary outcomes at follow-up
Primary outcome was adherence to LAIs, again calculated
as the percentage of LAIs received out of those
prescribed over the relevant time periods, that is, over
6 months and over an additional 18 months post inter-
vention. Secondary outcomes were LAI adherence ≥95%,
psychiatric hospital admissions and untoward incidents
including police arrest, violent acts and suicide attempts.
As in the analysis of the effects during the intervention
period, in the calculation, adherence periods spent in
hospitals were not considered.
Statistical analyses
Primary outcome
A linear mixed effects regression model with a random
effect for the clinical treatment team in which patients
received care was used to examine the differences in
adherence levels during the 6-month follow-up data. We
adjusted for the adherence measure at baseline, MINI
International Neuropsychiatric Interview score of team
catchment area at randomisation15 and the average pre-
scription cycle of LAIs during the baseline period, which
depending on the type of medication and speciﬁc pre-
scription varied between every week and every 4 weeks.
A simple linear regression model including only a
ﬁxed effect for allocation was ﬁtted to the additional
follow-up data for the 18 months period between month
7 and month 24. As the intraclass correlation for adher-
ence was negative (−0.05), we did not include a random
effect for team. Various sensitivity analyses were con-
ducted: (A) setting adherence of patients with reports of
refusing medication to 0%, (B) setting adherence of
patients transferred to primary care to 100% and (C)
including patients with less than 4 months’ adherence
data during the 6 month follow-up period.
Secondary outcomes
For the initial follow-up period of 6 months and the sub-
sequent 18 months, achieving at least 95% adherence
was analysed using mixed effects logistic regression
models as described for the primary outcome analysis.
This adherence level was chosen to reﬂect quasi com-
plete adherence. In line with the statistical analyses plan,
hospital admissions and adverse events were summarised
descriptively at both time intervals due to insufﬁcient
power to detect any differences between groups.
RESULTS
The ﬂow of the participants throughout the duration of
the study and socio-demographic and clinical character-
istics are presented in the CONSORT diagram
(ﬁgure 1) and table 1, respectively. Of the 141 rando-
mised patients, 9 were lost to the 6-month follow-up. Of
the 132 remaining, the primary outcome could be
deﬁned for 106 patients. However, only 99 (58 interven-
tion patients and 41 control patients) had the primary
outcome deﬁned at both baseline and 6-month
follow-up. At 24 months post intervention, 131 patients
remained: additional ﬁve patients were lost from the
6-month follow-up, while four patients lost to 6-month
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follow-up returned to the study (ie, two patients, who
had moved away, and two who had been out of the com-
munity or discharged to primary care). The primary
outcome could be deﬁned for 116 patients (ie, for 66
intervention patients and 50 control patients). This
equates to overall follow-up rates of 75.2% after
6 months and 82.3% after 24 months.
As we have previously shown, less frequent cycles were
linked with better adherence.16 The changes in treat-
ment cycles throughout the study and associated adher-
ence levels are presented in table 2 and table 3,
respectively.
The presented descriptive data point to a greater tran-
sitioning to less frequent cycles in the control group
than in the intervention group throughout the study.
Although the study protocol did not inﬂuence
whether or not incentives in the intervention group
would be continued after the 1-year study period, in
practice no patient was offered further incentives by
their care teams.
Primary outcome
To aid transparency in the change in outcomes through-
out the study, table 4 presents the primary outcome at
Figure 1
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Table 1 Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics at baseline, end of intervention and 6-month and 24-month follow-ups
Baseline End of Intervention 6-month follow-up 24-month follow-up
Incentives
(N=78) Control (N=63)
Incentives
(N=77) Control (N=60)
Incentives
(N=76) Control (N=60)
Incentives
(N=77) Control (N=59)
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD or
%
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD or
%
Demographics
Age (years) 44.4 9.6 42.7 10.2 45.2 9.3 43.3 10.0 45.6 9.3 43.7 10.0 47.2 9.3 45.5 9.9
Male sex 59 76% 46 73% 59 76% 45 76% 58 76% 46 77% 59 77% 45 76%
Ethnicity
White 49 63% 34 57% 49 63% 33 56% 47 62% 34 57% 48 62% 33 56%
Black 17 22% 14 23% 17 22% 14 24% 17 22% 14 23% 17 22% 14 24%
Asian 5 6% 4 7% 5 6% 4 7% 5 7% 4 7% 5 6% 4 7%
Mixed and other 7 9% 8 13% 7 9% 8 14% 7 9% 8 13% 7 9% 8 14%
Living situation
Married/co-habiting 8 10% 10 16% 8 10% 7 12% 6 8% 8 13% 12 16% 9 15%
Independent accommodation 53 68% 49 83% 53 68% 50 85% 52 68% 47 81% 48 64% 45 80%
Living alone 41 62% 34 62% 43 55% 35 59% 40 63% 34 64% 44 60% 33 69%
Paid employment (any) 3 4% 1 2% 4 5% 0 0% 4 5% 2 3% 4 5% 1 2%
Receiving benefits 76 99% 58 100% 70 97% 54 98% 70 97% 57 97% 68 96% 48 100%
Diagnosis
Schizophrenia 61 78% 52 82% 56 81% 45 83% 57 75% 45 75% 56 73% 45 76%
Schizoaffective disorders 9 12% 8 12% 8 12% 5 9% 11 14% 11 18% 11 14% 7 12%
Bipolar affective disorder 6 8% 1 2% 4 6% 3 6% 5 7% 3 5% 5 7% 4 7%
Other psychosis 2 2% 1 2% 1 1% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0%
Other diagnosis 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 1 1% 1 2% 3 1% 3 5%
Clinical history
Duration of illness (years) 18.2 8.6 17.3 8.5 19.2 8.6 18.3 8.6 19.9 8.6 18.8 8.5 21.2 8.6 20.5 8.5
Number of psychiatric
hospitalisations over
assessment period
0.9 2.7 59 0.6 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.4 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.9 2.3 0.5 1.2
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Table 2 Treatment cycles during baseline, intervention period and during the two follow-up periods
Depot cycle
Baseline End of Intervention 1–6-month follow-up 7–24-month follow-up
Incentives Control Incentives Control Incentives Control Incentives Control
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
1/52 4 5.6 3 5.5 2 2.7 1 1.8 2 3.3 3 6.7 3 4 1 2
2/52 50 69.4 34 61.8 51 68.0 29 51.8 38 62.3 20 32.8 44 63 24 44
3/52 5 6.9 2 3.6 4 5.3 3 5.4 4 6.6 2 4.5 3 7 1 2
4/52 12 16.7 13 23.6 13 17.3 18 32.1 11 18.0 13 28.9 11 16 20 37
Variable 1 1.4 3 5.5 5 6.7 5 8.9 6 9.8 7 15.6 7 10 8 15
Total 72 100 55 100 75 100 56 100 61 100 45 100 70 100 54 100
Table 3 Adherence by treatment cycle at baseline, during the intervention period and during follow-up periods
Treatment
cycle
Baseline period (N=123) Intervention period (N=123) 1–6-month follow-up (N=110) 7–24-month follow-up (N=110)
Incentives
(N=71)
Control
(N=52)
Incentives
(N=71)
Control
(N=52)
Incentives
(N=66)
Control
(N=54)
Incentives
(N=66)
Control
(N=54)
N
Mean
adherence
(%) N
Mean
adherence
(%) N
Mean
adherence N
Mean
adherence
(%) N
Mean
adherence
(%) N
Mean
adherence
(%) N
Mean
adherence
(%) N
Mean
adherence
(%)
1/52 2 54 1 45 2 82 1 49 3 76 3 64 3 78 1 85
2/52 49 67 27 68 49 83 27 74 41 71 23 74 41 67 24 73
3/52 4 76 3 66 4 97 3 44 4 77 2 83 5 74 1 77
4/52 12 76 16 66 12 92 16 73 13 71 20 74 11 66 18 73
5/52 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 71 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Variable cycle 4 60 5 62 4 72 5 72 4 59 6 87 6 68 6 75
n/a, not applicable.
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Table 4 Primary and secondary outcomes at baseline, end of intervention and 6-month and 24-month follow-ups
Incentives Control
Period
n*
74†/
75‡
Number (%) or
means (SD)
n*
58†/
56‡
Number (%) or
means (SD)
Type of effect
estimate
Adjusted effect estimate
(intervention vs control) p Value ICC
Primary outcome
Adherence (percentage)
to depot medication
Baseline 72 69% (16%) 55 67% (16%)
12-month intervention 75 85% (15%) 56 71% (22%) Difference in
means¶
11.5% (3.9% to 19.0%)** 0.0003 0.28
1–6-month follow-up 58 70% (24%) 41 77% (19%) Difference in
means¶
−7.4% (−17.0% to 2.1%) 0.127 0.175
7–24-month follow-up 66 68% (21%) 50 74% (19%) Difference in
means
−5.7% (−13.1% to 1.7%) 0.130 n/a
Secondary outcomes
Achieving at least 95%
adherence vs not
Baseline 72 5 (7%) 55 1 (2%)
12-month intervention 75 21 (28%) 56 3 (5%) OR¶ 8.21 (2.00 to 33.67) 0.003 0.04
1–6-month follow-up 66 5 (8%) 54 9 (17%) OR¶ 0.42 (0.11 to 1.61) 0.205 <0.001
7–24-month follow-up 66 4 (6%) 50 5 (10%) OR 0.42 (0.06 to 3.02) 0.392 0.42
At least one psychiatric
hospital admission
Baseline 78 14 (19%) 60 10 (17%)
12-month intervention 78 15 (19%) 59 14 (24%)
1–6-month follow-up 74 15 (20%) 58 8 (14%)
7–24-month follow-up 77 24 (31%) 60 10 (17%)
At least one suicide
attempt vs none
Baseline 78 9 (12%) 59 7 (12%)
12-month intervention 77 8 (10%) 58 4 (7%)
1–6-month follow-up 73 3 (4%) 58 3 (5%)
7–24-month follow-up 75 5 (7%) 58 3 (5%)
At least one violent
incident vs none
Baseline 77 15 (20%) 60 10 (17%)
12-month intervention 77 10 (13%) 58 7 (12%)
1–6-month follow-up 73 4 (6%) 58 3 (5%)
7–24-month follow-up 75 11 (15%) 58 7 (12%)
At least one police arrest
vs none
Baseline 77 13 (18%) 60 9 (16%)
12-month intervention 77 10 (13%) 60 10 (17%)
1–6-month follow-up 73 6 (8%) 58 3 (5%)
7–24-month follow-up 75 14 (19%) 58 10 (17%)
*n is the number of patients in either group with both a baseline and follow-up period for the specified outcome.
†Number of patients during 6-month follow-up. Excludes 9 patients on whom no data were collected during the 6-month follow-up period: 2 who withdrew immediately after randomisation and 1
who was withdrawn as was not being prescribed depot medication, 1 who died during the intervention period, 2 who were discharged during the intervention period, 1 who was discharged
during the 6-month follow-up period, 1 who moved abroad during follow-up and 1 who was out of the community for all of the follow-up period.
‡Number of patients during 24-month follow-up. Excludes 4 patients who were lost to follow-up before the start of the 6-month follow-up period. Of the remaining 137 patients, 5 were lost during
the 6-month follow-up and a further 5 were lost to follow-up during the final phase of the study. Four patients lost during the 6-month follow-up returned to the study.
¶Each model was adjusted for baseline measure of outcome, MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview score category (low vs high) and average treatment cycle during baseline, and
includes a random effect for team.
ICC, Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.
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all assessment periods. Mean adherence calculated on
all available cases for the 6-month and further 18-month
follow-up periods was 71% and 68% in the intervention
group, and 78% and 74% in the control group. The dif-
ference between the groups was not statistically signiﬁ-
cant at either time point (adjusted means difference for
ﬁrst 6 months −7.4%, 95% CI −17.0 to 2.1, p=0.175; for
following 18 months −5.7, 95% CI −13.1% to 1.7%,
p=0.130).
The results of the sensitivity analyses were very similar
to the main analyses, that is, all reﬂected slightly lower
adherence in the intervention group with the difference
not being statistically signiﬁcant (table 5).
Secondary outcomes
The effect of ﬁnancial incentives on secondary out-
comes through the study is presented in table 5. The
percentage of patients achieving at least 95% adherence
during the 6-month and further 18-month follow-up was
not signiﬁcantly different between groups (adjusted OR
at 6 months=0.42, 95% CI 0.11 to 1.61, p=0.205; and at
24 months=0.42, 95% CI 0.06 to 3.02, p=0.392). No sub-
stantial differences were noted in adverse events in
either follow-up period. However, there were a higher
number of hospital admissions in the intervention
group in 6-month and 24-month follow-ups, a difference
which, according to our prespeciﬁed analysis plan, was
shown with only descriptive statistics.
DISCUSSION
Once ﬁnancial incentives stop after a year, adherence
levels to LAIs return approximately to the levels at the
time before the intervention had started. While the posi-
tive effect of incentives was consistent for the 1-year
intervention period, the return to baseline levels occurs
in the ﬁrst 6 months and remains stable for the 2 years
that patients were followed up in this study. Adherence
levels in the intervention group were even lower than in
the control group, but the differences are small and not
statistically signiﬁcant. The ﬁndings suggest that
improvements are not sustained, but do not provide any
evidence for a negative long-term impact—so called
‘crowding out’—either. No statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ences were found for the secondary outcomes, although
descriptively patients in the intervention group showed
an increased number of hospital admissions in compari-
son to the control group in both follow-up periods.
Strengths and limitations
The study followed patients up over a 2-year period after
the 1-year intervention. No patient in the intervention
group had been offered further incentives after the
research determined 1-year intervention period. One
may wonder whether stopping incentives for all patients
despite signiﬁcant improvements in adherence and
quality of life of some patients was clinically—and ethic-
ally—appropriate. Yet, the fact that no patient continued
to be offered incentives simpliﬁed the evaluation of
long-term effects as there was no variation in the dur-
ation of the intervention. The ﬁndings for the ﬁrst
6 months and the subsequent 18 months were similar,
suggesting a consistent effect over time.
The follow-up study also has several limitations. The
most important is that follow-up data were not complete.
While the 1-year outcome data in the original 1-year
study had only a small number of dropouts, the dropout
rate substantially increased during the 2-year follow-up
period. While the overall follow-up rates of 75% and
82% may be regarded as reasonable, missing data may
be a particular problem in this type of study. Missing
data were due to a number of reasons, such as referral
of the patient to primary care or a complete loss of
contact with services. These reasons may reﬂect different
scenarios and outcomes. In any case, missing data are
unlikely to have occurred at random. It is impossible to
assess with certainty whether and, if so, how this selec-
tion inﬂuenced the results. However, sensitivity analyses
with extreme assumptions about the missing data did
not alter the ﬁndings. Adherence rates were also asso-
ciated with the prescription cycle which changed
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis of primary outcome at the two follow-up periods
1–6-month follow-up 7–24-month follow-up
Analysis population N
Difference
in mean
adherence 95% CI p Value N
Difference
in mean
adherence 95% CI p Value
Main analysis: all participants with
≥4 months’ depot data
108 −6.2% −13.1% to 0.7% 0.078 116 −5.7%* −13.1% to 1.7% 0.130
All participants as above, setting
adherence to 100% for those
discharged to GP
130 −5.0% −14.7% to 4.7% 0.316 119 −6.2%* −13.6% to 1.1% 0.097
All participants as above but setting
adherence to 0% for refusers
112 −4.9% −14.3% to 4.2% 0.312 124 −6.4%† −15.0%—2.1% 0.142
*Simple linear regression model including only a fixed effect for intervention versus control. Clustering by team ignorable as the ICC was −0.05.
†Linear mixed effects model including only a fixed effect for intervention versus control. The model-based ICC was p<0.001.
GP, General Practitioner.
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differently in the two groups with a tendency towards
longer cycles in the control group, and longer cycles
were overall associated with better adherence rates. Yet,
the changes within each group were inconsistent and
the numbers too small for a separate analysis of sub-
groups with speciﬁc patterns of changes. Further limita-
tions are that patients were not interviewed again, so
that we did not assess effects and side effects of the
medication, and could not explore whether the signiﬁ-
cant advantages of the intervention group in subjective
quality of life were maintained or also lost during the
follow-up; and that the study was not powered to estab-
lish whether the small adherence differences in favour
of the control group were statistically signiﬁcant or to
detect statistically signiﬁcant differences in rarer second-
ary outcomes such as rehospitalisations.
Implications
The ﬁndings are consistent with previous literature that
suggests that offering ﬁnancial incentives may improve
health-related behaviours for as long as they are pro-
vided. This applies to both general17 and mental health
populations.18 19 While a recent systematic review on the
effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives on health-related
behaviours including smoking cessation, diet, reduced
alcohol consumption and physical activity suggested that
positive effects might last for a short period (ie,
3 months) beyond the provision of incentives,20 there is
strong evidence suggesting that these beneﬁts are not
sustained and that there are no positive long-term
effects.9 10 19 The ﬁndings of our study show that this
applies to improved adherence to antipsychotic mainten-
ance medication too.
The FIAT study as a whole has provided clear ﬁndings
with direct clinical implications. The follow-up study
complements the picture of the main trial. The number
of patients in the NHS in England who fulﬁl the inclu-
sion criteria of this study has been estimated to be lower
than 1800 at one time.6 For these patients, ﬁnancial
incentives improve adherence to antipsychotic depot
medication for as long as they are offered, at least for a
full year. However, the potential hope that patients with
improved adherence may have experienced sufﬁcient
beneﬁts to maintain the improved adherence level even
when incentives are stopped seems to be unjustiﬁed. At
least on a group level, there is no evidence for such sus-
tained beneﬁt. On the other hand, there is no evidence
either that offering incentives would lead to negative
long-term effects once they are stopped. When ﬁnancial
incentives are considered to improve adherence to anti-
psychotic depot medication, potential positive or nega-
tive long-term effects may not be a main criterion.
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